This thesis explores the foundations of cognition. I present, analyze, and defend the claim of Computationalism, which states that cognition reduces to computations. I show how various objections, in particular Searle's Chinese Room argument, are flawed due to a deep confusion regarding the nature of computation. In my defense of Computationalism, I appeal to the notion of emergence, which is a notion that I analyze in detail, since it has been suggested that emergence can solve the problem of consciousness. I (...) argue against this latter suggestion, proposing an alternative view on consciousness instead. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.

A number of modern logic books give a misrepresentation of Mill's Methods as originally conceived by Mill. In this paper, I point out what I believe is a better presentation of Mill's Methods. This treatment is not only historically more accurate, but it also represents a better conceptual introduction to Mill's Methods in general.